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1 Introductory remarks. 
 
From 19th July 2011 it became possible for UK resident companies to elect for profits of 
their foreign permanent establishments (‘PEs’) to be excluded from the UK taxable base. 
Before the consultation period for the proposed changes had closed, George Monbiot, the 
well-known environmental and political activist, published an article on the proposals 
under the following headline1: 
 
‘To us, it’s an obscure shift of tax law. To the City, it’s the heist of the century.’ 
 
The aims of this paper are twofold. Firstly, I shall attempt to determine whether the 
changes introduced by s48 and Sch 13 Finance Act 2011 constitute acceptable tax 
competition and/or simplification. Secondly, I shall consider whether Mr Monbiot was 
right in describing the change in tax law as a ‘heist’. The metaphorical robbery concerned 
is the transfer of wealth from the poor and middle to the rich. According to Monbiot, the 
elective exemption for the profits of foreign PEs constitutes the greatest such transfer in 
the UK for a century. One should observe at the outset that it is possible for both of the 
questions posed in the objectives to be answered in the affirmative: a simpler and more 
competitive UK tax regime may, prima facie, result in a transference of wealth. However, 
the second-order effect on this equation of the benefits of attracting foreign direct 
investment is difficult to assess. In this sense, the title to the paper is somewhat 
misleading: the propositions are not alternatives. Furthermore, as regards the concept of 
acceptable tax competition, it must be acknowledged that acceptability is subjective. 
______________________________ 
  
In Part 2, I shall begin with a description of the problem of double taxation and the 
different methods of providing relief from it. The UK’s decision to allow companies to opt 
for one of those methods in respect of the profits of their foreign branches is an apparent 
cause of the regressive redistribution of which Monbiot disapproves. I shall therefore 
consider the mechanism by which double tax relief could in theory lead to this 
transference of wealth. In describing the ways in which states may allow taxpayers double 
tax relief, I shall examine the differences between relief by credit and relief by exemption. 
The different approaches lead to Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) and Capital Import 
Neutrality (CIN), respectively. These concepts will be analysed as general background to 
the FA 2011 change, in particular as to why either (or both) may be attained and be 
economically desirable. More UK-specific reasons for the different approach will then be 
reviewed, including the impact of  the developing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). In this context I shall argue that whether or not the foreign 
branch exemption was truly considered desirable for ‘UK Plc’, in reality the Government 
had little choice. 
______________________________ 
 
In the third part, I shall describe the operation of the new regime. Critical questions to be 
addressed will involve discussion of the parameters of the exemption and, in particular, 
difficulties in establishing the quantum of foreign branch profits (and losses) to be 
exempted from UK taxation. The attribution of profits to PEs is, of course, a very 
substantial topic in its own right. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed 
exegesis on profit attribution but some analysis is required of specific problems. In 
                                                     
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/07/tax-city-heist-of-century 
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particular, as HMRC stated in its impact notes on the 2011 Budget2, the exemption is 
likely to be of particular relevance to large financial service companies. The reasons for 
this will be discussed but the attribution of profits to branches in that sector gives rise to 
specific problems of capital attribution for the purposes of calculating deductible interest 
expense. Clearly, taxpayer companies that make the election will have an interest in 
maximising the profits attributed to their foreign PEs: this will minimise profits taxable in 
the UK. In that regard, companies will seek to minimise funding deductions  attributable 
to their PEs. Similarly, tax relief for capital expenditure (capital allowances) will have to 
be considered since that might otherwise enable foreign branch profits to be overstated. 
The position as regards gains on the disposal of capital assets will also be discussed. 
 
George Monbiot states that ‘while big business will be exempt from tax on its foreign 
branch earnings, it will, amazingly, still be able to claim the expense of funding its foreign 
branches against tax it pays in the UK.’ I shall argue that Mr Monbiot has misunderstood 
the situation as regards branch profit attribution, especially in light of the new Article 7 of 
the OECD Model Treaty. 
 
Aside from profit attribution, other issues to be considered in respect of the exemption will 
be the position for electing companies whose foreign PEs have been loss-making in prior 
periods. Under the existing/former residence basis of taxation, those losses will have been 
relieved against UK taxable income of the company. Issues of the symmetrical treatment 
of profits and losses arise when the loss-making PE moves into profit; conversely, exempt 
foreign branch losses sustained in a ‘start-up’ situation might never be utilised if the 
relevant activities do not come to fruition. 
 
Finally, in part 3, I shall move to a discussion of whether the complexities inherent in the 
branch exemption could possibly constitute tax simplification. Simplification is, of course, 
a relative concept so a comparison with the credit regime will be required. I shall argue 
that since many of the same difficulties and calculations are present under both systems, it 
is difficult to maintain that the FA 2011 rules simplified UK tax law in any way. 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
In part 4, I shall discuss tax competition. HM Treasury stated3: ‘The Government’s aim is 
to create the most competitive corporate tax system in the G20’. I shall begin by 
discussing why it was considered that a move towards fiscal territoriality via a foreign 
branch exemption would make the UK a more attractive location for companies operating 
internationally. Underlying Monbiot’s argument is the premise that the elective exemption 
for foreign branch profits facilitates unacceptable tax competition or, possibly, that no 
form of tax competition is ever acceptable.  His ‘heist’ arises not just as a direct result of 
an export of tax base but also from corporate restructuring designed to maximise the 
benefit of that export. The factors of production will be moved into low tax jurisdictions 
with catastrophic effects for the origin country.  In addition to the impact on the UK, the 
new rules, he says, ‘threaten to degrade the tax base everywhere’. The degradation would 
arise as a result of states’ being compelled continually to reduce their corporate tax rates 
                                                     
2 Accessed at: www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2011/overview.pdf 
3 July 2010 Discussion Document p5. 
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so as to attract foreign direct investment: in an exemption world, the only tax payable is 
the tax levied by the source state. 
 
The UK position will be considered in the context of the work of the OECD and EU on tax 
competition. The FA 2011 provisions’ ‘anti-diversion’ rules will be considered in this 
context which, in turn, will necessitate some further discussion of the UK’s new CFC 
rules. Artificiality and contrivance are key concepts. 
 
Ultimately, the issues of free movement of capital in a free global market and fiscal 
sovereignty are at the heart of the tax competition debate. The discretionary power to raise 
taxes in an amount and manner of the state’s choosing is one of the key attributes of 
nationhood. International tax law does impose constraints: no double taxation but not less 
than single taxation is normative. Within the constraints imposed, tax competition is 
regarded as being acceptable. 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
Finally, in light of the foregoing, I shall endeavour to draw some conclusions on the 2011 
changes as acceptable tax competition and simplification and also on the ‘heist’ question. 
Despite its polemical nature, Monbiot’s article raises important questions deserving of 
proper analysis, not least his concerns as to the nature of the tax policy-making that lead to 
the exemption which I find to be without foundation. 
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2 Double Taxation. 
Juridical double taxation arises from two states imposing tax on the same legal person in 
respect of the same item (e.g. income, gain, asset). In the introduction  to the OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and Capital4, it is described thus: 
‘International juridical double taxation can be generally defined as the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
subject matter and for identical periods.’  
Economic double taxation is to be distinguished in that it consists in different taxpayers 
being subject to taxation on the same item. An example of economic double taxation may 
be seen in the taxation of corporate profits: these may be taxed both on the company and on 
its shareholders. The taxpayer election at Chapter 3A of CTA 2009 has the primary purpose 
of relieving juridical double taxation of the profits of foreign establishments of UK resident 
companies. Such double taxation arises as a result of the UK and the other state both 
retaining jurisdiction to tax the profits of the non-UK PE: in international tax law the UK 
has the right to tax the worldwide income of the company based on the ‘in personam’ 
connecting factor of residence; the PE host state has fiscal jurisdiction over the company 
since the branch is an ‘in rem’ connection between it and the taxpayer.  
2 (i) Credit and exemption. 
 
It is generally accepted that the economic cost of juridical double taxation is an 
insurmountable obstacle to cross-border trade and investment. Since such activity is 
considered to be universally desirable (at least from the perspective of globalisation), states 
have sought to eliminate double taxation both unilaterally and bilaterally, via their network of 
tax treaties.  
 
The methods  adopted have been credit and exemption (or a combination of the two). Both 
techniques are acceptable as international tax norms: Article 23 of the OECD Model 
encompasses both approaches as alternatives. Article 23A (exemption) obliges the residence 
state to exempt from taxation income and capital that may, in accordance with the treaty, be 
taxed in the source state5. The exemption is to apply irrespective of whether the source state 
actually taxes the income or not. Article 23B (credit) obliges the residence state to deduct tax 
paid in the source state from the domestic tax liability. Under credit systems, the reduction 
for foreign tax is invariably limited to the domestic tax payable on the relevant income: the 
so-called ‘ordinary credit’ limitation. (The ‘relevant income’ may refer to the particular 
source or country or group of countries.) Credit and exemption are also acceptable 
alternatives under the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive6. Blanluet and Durand7 commented 
that International Fiscal Association branch reports revealed a fairly even distribution of 
credit and exemption methods among the domestic tax laws of IFA reporting countries: 11 
states were pure credit jurisdictions and 8 states used exemption. 13 countries used a hybrid 
                                                     
4 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2010, hereinafter ‘OECD Model’. 
5 Article 23A (exemption method) provides for the credit method to apply in respect of tax withheld on 
dividends and interest in the source state.  
6 Council Directive of 23 July 1990 (90/435/EEC). 
7 IFA 2011, volume 96b. 
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system, applying credit relief in general but exempting the profits of foreign subsidiaries. 
(Two states had no domestic provisions for double tax relief.) 
 
Credit and exemption have been closely aligned with two models for achieving tax neutrality. 
Received economic wisdom is that tax neutrality (whereby tax is not a distortive factor in 
business and investment decisions) leads to an optimal allocation of resources. The respective 
models are Capital Export Neutrality (‘CEN’) and Capital Import Neutrality (‘CIN’). 
Blanluet and Durand8 rightly remark that differences between the two neutralities ‘have 
resulted in endless and spurious controversies, as shown by an overly abundant literature 
discussing the comparable merits of each proposed system.’ They may also be valid in stating 
that these questions (and credit versus exemption discussions) pertain more to politics and 
economics than they do to taxation. A brief analysis is, nevertheless, required since, as will 
be described in the following section, the FA 2011 provisions may be seen as part of a 
general UK shift in the direction of CIN/exemption. 
 
In summary, CEN is accomplished when taxpayers are subject to an equivalent level of 
taxation whether they invest at home or abroad and this is achieved by the residence state 
taxing the worldwide income of its residents. Thus residents do not have a financial incentive 
to invest in low tax jurisdictions and there is ‘horizontal equity’ between those taxpayers who 
invest domestically and those who invest internationally. There would, however, be a 
disincentive to invest in other states if no relief were given for source state taxation so credit 
relief is required for true neutrality to obtain. (Under an ‘ordinary’ credit system, as discussed 
above, relief is limited to domestic tax payable on the income concerned. If, therefore, the 
source state imposes a higher level of taxation than the residence state, CEN will not occur: 
the investor would have a higher effective rate of taxation as a result of investing in the other 
country.) 
 
Under CIN, by contrast, all investments into a particular state have to bear the same effective 
tax burden; when that applies, residents and non-residents can compete on equivalent terms in 
the given market. This requires the assignment of taxing rights solely to the source state and, 
therefore, exemption from tax in the state of residence of the capital exporter. In the 
following section I shall discuss why it might be that the UK has apparently decided to move 
from CEN (credit) to CIN (exemption). 
 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to discuss how ‘an obscure shift of tax law’ (a limited change 
in the method of relieving double taxation) could generate the transference of wealth that is 
Mr. Monbiot’s ‘heist’. 
 
The mechanism that could give rise to regressive redistribution is that the corporate tax yield 
would decrease as a result of exempting from charge the profits of UK companies’ foreign 
PEs. Absent a reduction in public expenditure and/or an increased public sector borrowing 
requirement, the lost revenue would have to be collected by an increase in other taxes such as 
VAT. Reducing taxation on the return of capital invested in companies whilst increasing that 
levied on consumption reduces the ratio of tax paid to income for the wealthy but increases it 
for the poor. Hence the measure could be regarded as being regressive. 
 
The global effects of shifts in the tax ‘mix’ are uncertain. From the UK perspective, however, 
the immediate question is whether a change from credit to exemption for a particular type of 
                                                     
8 ibid 
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outbound investment would necessarily result in a reduction in corporate tax revenue. Under 
the credit system, ceteris paribus, the profits of foreign branches generate revenue for the UK 
Exchequer only to the extent that they have been subject to a lower level of taxation in the 
host country. Effectively, additional tax is paid in the UK to ‘top-up’ the host state tax to 
secure that the effective rate of tax on the relevant income is that of the UK (hence CEN 
would be achieved). Therefore, any diminution in UK Corporation Tax collected as a result 
of the move to exemption could only arise as the difference between the UK effective rate 
and the host country rate on profits attributable to the PE. 
 
According to HMRC’s Tax Information and Impact Note published on March 23rd 20119 the 
Exchequer impact of the (then) Budget proposal to offer foreign branch exemption was as 
follows (£m): 
 
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
 
0 -30 -70 -80 -80 
 
 
The financial impact will take into account the negative effect described above but also the 
positive effect of excluding overseas branch losses (as described in Part 3, below). Based on 
the total tax collected by HMRC (£467bn in 2011-12) it is clear that the expected impact of 
the exemption is nugatory in the extreme. Even as a proportion of the total Corporation Tax 
collected, the expected cost is less than one fifth of one percent10. The clear conclusion is that 
if the change is, in any sense, a ‘heist’ (which seems unlikely given the projected effect), it 
certainly cannot be described as ‘the heist of the century’. 
 
This is not to say that the FA 2011 changes might not, indirectly, have harmful global effects 
but these aspects are discussed further in Part 4, below. One should also note in passing that 
the further cuts in the statutory rate of Corporation Tax announced in the 2011 Budget are 
expected to have a far more significant direct impact on the Exchequer. The revenue effects 
(in addition to those of the reductions in FA 2010) were projected as follows (£m): 
 
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
 
-425 -810 -910 -1,000 -1,075 
 
 
 
 2 (ii) UK background. 
 
From 1945 to 2009 the UK gave relief for double taxation by way of (ordinary) credit.  This 
is a reflection of significant domestic demand for capital. In broad terms, where capital is 
required to fund the growth of domestic industries, it is rational not to offer fiscal incentives 
to invest abroad (e.g. by exempting low-tax foreign profits). 
 
In 1999 the (then) Inland Revenue concluded its analysis of technical arguments on credit and 
exemption by stating ‘….it would seem desirable for the United Kingdom to retain the credit 
                                                     
9 Accessed at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2011/tiin6420.pdf. 
10 Applying the cost of the measure to the long-term average Corporation Tax contribution for 2011-12 receipts. 
See further below at 4 (iii).  
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method of DTR and not to adopt the exemption method.’11  The main arguments in favour of 
retaining credit were that exemption encourages the diversion of resources into low tax 
jurisdictions and would not, in any event, simplify tax compliance. In the same document it 
was also stated that ‘the United Kingdom should not consciously engage in competing with 
other countries over which has the more generous DTR system’12. The FA 2011 changes 
suggest that this was reconsidered.  
 
In 2007, however, HMRC and HM Treasury announced that they would be consulting on 
foreign dividend exemption and the Controlled Foreign Companies (‘CFC’) regime for taxing 
undistributed profits of subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions. That consultation led to an 
effective dividend exemption from 1st July 2009 onwards and, thence, to the FA 2011 branch 
exemption election.  Among the government’s stated aims in exempting PE profits was the 
alignment of the treatment of foreign branches and subsidiaries.  The genesis of the dividend 
exemption is, therefore, intrinsic to the move to branch profits exemption so it is necessary to 
consider the developments between 1999 and 2007 that led to the former change.  
 
The agents of change during this period were European Community Law and declining UK 
competitiveness resulting in a series of corporate inversions13 by large multinational 
companies headquartered in the UK. 
 
Regarding the former aspect, in late 2006 the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) delivered its 
judgement in the FII Group Litigation case14. Under the system in force at the time 15and for 
many years previously, UK companies were exempt from Corporation Tax on dividends and 
distributions of other UK resident companies16.  Dividends received from non-UK companies 
were, however, taxable. Credit was given for any withholding tax on the dividend received 
and, subject to a minimum 10% ownership test, foreign tax paid in the corporate profits 
underlying the dividend. 
 
In the FII case, the claimants argued, inter alia, that the difference in treatment between 
dividends from UK and non-UK companies was a restriction on their freedom of 
establishment under (then) Article 43 TEC and an infringement of the guaranteed free 
movement of capital under Article 56 TEC. 
 
The ECJ held that where credit for underlying tax was available (i.e. >10% ownership), the 
differing treatment in the UK did not breach the TEC ‘provided that the rate of tax applied to 
foreign-sourced dividends is no higher than the rate of tax applied to nationally-sourced 
dividends’. Where no credit for underlying tax was available, the Court held that the UK 
distinction did breach Article 56. (Free moment of capital was the applicable freedom, rather 
                                                     
11 IR 1999 Discussion Document p19. 
12 ibid p7. 
13 ‘Inversions’ broadly consist in transferring the fiscal jurisdiction of the group holding company. This is 
effected by incorporating a new company in a suitable jurisdiction and offering shares in that new vehicle to 
shareholders in exchange for their existing holdings. The subsidiaries are then sold or distributed in specie to the 
new holding company. 
14 Test claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 12th December 2006, Case C-
446/04. 
15 s208 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (‘ICTA’). 
16 Dividends etc received on shares held as trading assets were taxable. 
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than freedom of establishment since portfolio holdings would not give the owners the 
required ‘definite influence’ over the company’s affairs.17) 
 
The ECJ left the question of differing rates of tax to the domestic court to decide. HMRC and 
HM Treasury, however, did not wait for the judgement of the High Court.  Whether acting to 
stem the rising tide of corporate inversions or (rightly) unconvinced that credit for underlying 
tax could arguably give equal treatment to UK and non-UK dividends, they began consulting 
on exemption in 2007 as discussed above. 
 
The High Court delivered its judgement on the tax rate question in November 200818.  
Henderson J held UK and non UK dividends had to be based at the same effective rate.  By 
then, however, it had already been announced (in the Pre-Budget Report) that dividends from 
non UK companies would, generally, be exempt. 
 
As Professor Avery Jones pointed out in his 2011 Klaus Vogel lecture19, it would be 
surprising if different treatment for dividends and PE profits viz. double tax relief was 
sustainable: ‘the taxpayer is effectively given a choice of system depending on how the 
investment is structured.’ The alignment of branches with subsidiaries in FA 2011 may also 
be seen as pre-emptive of a potential incompatibility with European Union law. Articles 49 
and 54 TFEU have the effect of prohibiting restrictions on companies from setting up 
branches or subsidiaries in other Member States.  A different (inferior) treatment as regards 
double tax relief for branches from that of subsidiaries could constitute a restriction imposed 
by the home state on its residents’ freedom to establish themselves in the other Member State.  
Therefore, pace Mr Monbiot, we may conclude that due to its treaty commitments to its EU 
partners, the UK had no option but to a) exempt dividends from non UK companies from tax 
and b) (therefore) exempt the profits of foreign branches also. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 A line of earlier cases had determined that ‘definite influence’ was a necessary condition for the freedom of 
establishment to be engaged.  
18 Test claimants in the FII Group Litigation v HM Revenue & Customs [2008] EWHC 2893. 
19 Avery-Jones 2011, paragraph 9. 
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3 The foreign profits exemption in practice. 
 
In the following section I shall consider the detailed application of the exemption, including 
the mechanics of the election and specific problems such as losses, capital allowances and 
capital gains. First, however, it will be necessary briefly to consider the definition of the 
business vehicle, the profits of which may be the subject of the exemption election. Central to 
the operation of the new regime is the quantification of the profits to be exempted: I shall 
consider this critical issue in the context of  international tax law and recent developments in 
this area. The issue of the expense of funding foreign branches where the profits are exempt 
was central to the Monbiot critique of the new regime so that aspect will also be addressed. 
 
3 (i) Mechanics of the election and considerations for companies. 
 
A company may elect for the profits and losses of its foreign branches to be left out of 
account for UK tax purposes. The election is in respect of all foreign PEs of the company 
(although see below in respect of the loss-streaming provisions). It applies to the first 
accounting period of the company beginning after the date of the election and is irrevocable, 
although may be withdrawn prior to the start of the first accounting period after the election. 
The reason for the election being irrevocable is that it would otherwise be possible for 
companies to opt in and out depending upon results; opting for exemption when, broadly, the 
foreign branches are profitable but including any losses in the UK tax base in unprofitable 
years. Clearly, companies will have to consider the position very carefully, in aggregate. That 
analysis contains many variables some of which are discussed in the sections following.    
 
The election works so as to require ‘exemption adjustments’20 to be made to ensure that the 
‘foreign permanent establishment amount’21 is not taken into account in calculating a 
company’s taxable profits for the accounting period. This amount is the aggregate of all the 
profits net of losses per territory for all the territories ‘outside the United Kingdom in which 
the company carries on, or has carried on, business through a permanent establishment.’22 
 
A ‘permanent establishment’ of a company for these purposes is: 
 
‘....a fixed place of business [....] through which the business of the company is 
wholly or partly carried on or an agent acting on behalf of the company [that] has and 
habitually exercises [....] authority to do business on behalf of the company.’23 
 
Examples of ‘fixed places of business’ are then given in the statute, followed by an exclusion 
from agency PE classification for, broadly, agents of independent status. Also excluded are 
fixed places of business wherein the only activities undertaken are ‘of a preparatory or 
auxiliary character.’24 
 
This definition of PE is almost identical to that at Article 5 of the 2010 OECD Model Treaty. 
There are minor differences such as the inclusion in the UK statute of ‘an installation or 
structure for the exploration of natural resources’. Furthermore, under the UK legislation, 
there is no requirement for a building site to last for more than 12 months to constitute a PE. 
                                                     
20 s18A(2) CTA 2009. 
21 s18A(4) ibid. 
22 s18A(5) ibid. 
23 s1141(1) CTA 2010. 
24 s1143(2) ibid. 
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The significance of these differences should not be overstated but it is at least theoretically 
possible that a PE may exist for purposes of the foreign branch exemption but not under the 
applicable double tax treaty (if congruent with the OECD Model).    
 
3 (ii) Profit attribution.  
 
Once it has been determined that a PE exists in a territory, it is necessary to attribute profits 
of the company to that PE in order to quantify the tax-exempt amount for the UK company. 
Under established attribution principles it is possible for a branch to be profitable when the 
organisation itself is not, and vice versa. Within an exemption regime, these results can have 
the effect of increasing UK losses or profits, respectively. Two approaches to attribution are 
prescribed, depending on the tax treaty status of the host state of the PE. (One may observe at 
this juncture that differing requirements for different branches may call into question any 
simplification claim for the new rules.)  
 
Where, firstly, the foreign PE of the UK company is located in a ‘full treaty territory’25, the 
profits to be the subject of the exemption are quantified in the same manner as for 
establishing the limit on credit for foreign taxes for companies that do not make the 
exemption election. The relevant legislation is to be found at s43 of the Taxation 
(International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (‘TIOPA’) which was introduced by paragraph 
27 of Schedule 13 to FA 2011.  
 
Alternatively, where the electing UK company operates via a branch in a non-treaty (or non-
full treaty) territory, exempt profits are calculated by an attribution based on the OECD 
Model. 
 
Regarding PEs in full treaty territories, the question arises as to whether the quantification of 
exempt profits under the credit limitation methodology would have the same result as that 
under the applicable treaty. Similarly, under the alternative methodology, where there exists a 
double tax treaty between the UK and the host state (that does not contain a non-
discrimination article), could there be differences between profit attribution under that treaty 
and the OECD Model? 
 
Differences in profit attribution under an exemption model can lead to double (or less than 
single) taxation as may be illustrated by the following example:    
 
Gamma, resident in State C, has a PE in State D. 
Global profits in the year to 31 December XY are 20,000,000 
State D attributes profits of 5,000,000 to the PE and taxes these profits at a rate of 30%. 
State C attributes profits of 4,000,000 to the PE for exemption purposes.  
 
State C taxes the global profits at 30% 6,000,000 
Less tax attributable to exempt foreign profits 
(=4,000,000 @ 30%) 
(1,200,000) 
State C tax due 4,800,000 
State D tax due 1,500,000 
                                                     
25 ‘Full treaty territory’ is defined (at s18R CTA 2009) as being a jurisdiction with which the UK has concluded 
a double tax treaty containing a non-discrimination provision. A ‘non-discrimination provision’ is a rule 
whereby permanent establishments of the treaty partner in the other state are not to be taxed less favourably than 
resident enterprises of that other state.   
13 
 
Total tax liability 6,300,000 
 
Thus profits totalling 1m have been taxed both in the host state and in the residence state.  If, 
conversely, C had attributed profits of 6m to the exempt foreign branch, profits of 1m would 
have escaped tax. 
 
The credit limitation method at s43 requires profits to be attributed to PEs as if they are 
‘distinct and separate’ enterprises that: 
 
(a) engage in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and 
(b) deal wholly independently with the (other parts of) the company. 
 
This methodology is an application of the ‘authorised OECD approach’ to profit attribution 
that was developed over a series of discussion drafts from 2001 onwards, leading to the 2010 
Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. As part of this process, the 
2008 Discussion Draft26 prompted a revision to Article 7 of the Model Treaty and 
Commentary. 
 
The issues associated with this approach (rather than the alternative of formulary 
apportionment of the entity’s results) are manifold and largely beyond the scope of this study. 
The principal problem, however, is that the separate enterprise method is founded on a 
fiction. As Baker and Collier pointed out in their General Report to the 2006 IFA Congress 
on the subject: 
 
‘....a PE is not a separate legal person. Thus, in legal terms: 
 
• there can be no legally binding contracts between a PE and other parts of the 
enterprise; 
• there can be no separate ownership of assets by the PE or its head office; 
• no payments can be made between the PE and its head office since the funds 
paid belong in law at all times to the same person; and 
• strictly speaking, no profit can be realised on a dealing between a PE and its 
head office.’ 
 
There is also an inherent inconsistency in the Article 7 requirement that the putative separate 
enterprise must be engaged in the ‘same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions’ (as the PE); that must necessitate some recognition of the fact that the branch is 
part of a larger organisation. Thus a situation arises whereby a PE is separate and distinct and 
yet has attributes of the enterprise of which it is a part that it would not have if it were, 
indeed, a separate entity (e.g. credit rating). 
 
The UK credit limitation rules that establish the quantum of exempt profits were amended at 
the same time as the election for exemption was introduced. The changes are relevant to an 
analysis of the question above regarding potential differences in attribution between s43 and 
an applicable double tax treaty. 
 
                                                     
26 Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD 2008. 
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Prior to FA 2011, the profits attributable to  overseas PEs for credit relief purposes were 
determined by reference to the rules27 for attributing profits to UK PEs of non-residents. 
Those rules were to be applied ‘with the necessary modifications’. The new regime is, prima 
facie, almost identical to the former. For example, the separate enterprise principle is, mutatis 
mutandis, described in precisely the same terms at s43(2)(a) and (b) TIOPA 2010 as it is at 
s21(1)(a) and (b) CTA 2009. There is also the same presumption that the putative separate 
company has the same credit rating as the organisation itself. There are, however, subtle 
differences between the approaches to UK and non-UK PEs, relating specifically to capital 
attribution. 
 
The attribution of capital to PEs is critical in determining the quantum of profits. In summary, 
equity capital is ‘free’ in that the cost of the capital (dividends) will not be tax deductible. 
The mix of capital attributed to the branch will make a significant difference to the 
exemption: the higher the amount of free capital attributed to the PE, the greater the level of 
tax-exempt profits. We may note a potential conflict in capital attribution for domestic and 
foreign branches in this respect: the domestic tax base will be increased by maximising the 
amount of capital to be attributed to non-residents’ UK branches whilst minimising the 
capital attributed to UK residents’ exempt overseas branches. 
 
Capital attribution will be particularly important for the banking industry (to which sector the 
exemption is expected to be most relevant). Banks’ capital adequacy ratios (effectively, the 
proportion of assets that must be funded out of equity) are internationally determined28 but 
monitored and enforced at the national level. Banks are supervised by the regulators in their 
home country. Provided that adequate levels of capital are maintained at the enterprise level 
overall, banks may effectively fund their activities conducted in overseas PEs entirely by 
debt. Hence banks operate via a branch network to enable scarce regulatory capital to be 
easily deployed in generating the best return. (One should note in  passing that, at the time of 
writing, regulatory authorities may be reconsidering branches in response to perceived 
failings of this system in the global financial crisis.)   The (dis)incorporation of appropriately 
capitalised legal entities as vehicles would be a relatively cumbersome and inefficient process 
in comparison. 
 
Under the new tax regime for non-UK branches, debt and equity capital of the enterprise is to 
be allocated to PEs on a ‘just and equitable’ basis, taking into account the entity’s capital 
usage in other locations as if each branch were a separate legal entity29.  For UK branches of 
non-residents, capital has to be attributed based on the amount that a separate legal entity 
would reasonably be expected to hold. This difference, between an allocation and the so-
called thin capitalisation approach is subtle but could be important. 
 
In its 2008 report on profit attribution, the OECD’s recommended methodology for allotting 
capital is, firstly, to attribute assets to the PE based on an analysis of ‘key entrepreneurial 
risk-taking functions’ and ‘significant people functions’. The next step is then to attribute free 
capital to support the risks (assets) that have been attributed. Three methods may be used to 
allocate equity: 
 
                                                     
27 @ Pt 2, Ch 4 CTA 2009. 
28 E.g. in accordance with the prudential standards established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
– Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 
(2006). 
29 s43(3)(b) and (4) TIOPA 2010.   
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(i) capital allocation; 
(ii) thin capitalisation; 
(iii) quasi-thin capitalisation/regulatory minimum capital amount. 
 
Under the capital allocation approach, the total of the bank’s relevant equity is allocated to its 
permanent establishments based on their relative holding of the whole bank’s risk-adjusted 
assets. The thin capitalisation approach effectively seeks to attribute capital based on the 
amount that an independent entity carrying on the same or similar activities under the same 
conditions would typically hold. The third alternative basis is a variant on the thin 
capitalisation approach whereby capital is attributed based on the minimum amount a local 
regulator would require of a legal entity established in that state with the same assets. 
 
Each methodology, the OECD argues, has arguments in favour and against. The conclusion30 
was that, although there is consensus that capital should be allocated to PEs, ‘it will not be 
possible to develop a single, internationally accepted approach for making that attribution of 
capital’. 
 
It will be apparent that the UK legislation encompasses a capital allocation approach for 
overseas branches and a thin capitalisation approach for UK branches. The inconsistency may 
not, ultimately, be material but the difference is intriguing in that the latter approach would 
tend to increase the amount of free capital attributed to a branch: there is no effective limit 
based on the total capital of the entity itself as there is under the capital allocation 
methodology. Additionally, the rules for attributing profits to UK PEs do not allow 
deductions for royalties paid to other parts of the company in consideration for the use of 
intangible assets (although a deduction for a contribution to the costs incurred in creating 
intellectual property is allowed). Furthermore, deductions are not allowed for interest 
payments on intra entity funding (except, broadly, for branches of banks). Neither of these 
restrictions applies to the s43 TIOPA  rules for attributing profits to non-UK branches for 
credit limitation or exemption purposes. As a result, the quantum of exempt profits is likely 
to decrease.  
 
The issue, however, is whether the capital allocation approach under s43 could conflict with 
that under the relevant double tax treaty with the host jurisdiction. As can be seen from the 
above example of Gamma, double (or less than single) taxation can arise from different 
attributions of profit in the source and residence states. In this respect, perhaps somewhat 
unnecessarily given the precedence of double tax treaties over domestic UK law, s43(5) was 
inserted by FA 2011 to make clear that the capital attribution methodology for credit and 
exemption purposes is subject to the provisions of the applicable treaty. 
 
One might add, in passing, that s43(6) was added to ensure that capital attribution for tax 
purposes is independent of any capital ‘held’ in branches according to the company’s 
management accounts. This provision, itself subordinate to double tax treaties, was 
presumably included as a result of successful litigation undertaken by Nat West Bank in the 
United States where it operated through a branch31. In brief, the bank successfully argued that 
its US branch could deduct interest ‘paid’ on intra-bank funding it had received on the 
grounds that the (then) US/UK double tax treaty required the branch to be treated as a 
separate legal entity dealing with the rest of the bank at arm’s length. The US domestic rules 
                                                     
30 OECD report para 124 
31 44 Fed Cl 120 (1999) (‘Nat West I’) and 58Fed Cl 491 (2003) (‘Nat West II’). 
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(Treasury Regulation 1.882-5) required a formulary apportionment of the entity’s funding 
costs.) In Nat West II, the bank successfully argued that properly maintained accounts of the 
US branch should be used to determine its business profits, including funding costs, under 
Article 7 of the treaty; it was inappropriate to allot notional capital to the branch. The US 
Federal Claims Court’s findings were prefigured 25 years earlier when a group of UK banks 
sought an opinion on the subject from leading counsel32. His opinion was that ‘the 
Convention gives no authority to write into the branch accounts a level of capital which the 
branch does not have.’ One should add, however, that in an Exchange of Notes on the 2001 
US/UK treaty of 2001, it was made explicit that profits attributable under Article 7 are to be 
derived having attributed capital on a thin capitalisation basis or for financial organisations 
except for insurance companies, on a capital allocation basis. Nat West Bank’s arguments 
would not, therefore, be successful having regard to the new treaty. 
 
For full treaty partners, profit attribution for exemption purposes will, effectively be in 
accordance with the treaty (specifically as regards capital attribution) but Article 7 may be 
interpreted differently by the home and host state tax authorities. If double taxation results, 
the taxpayer may have recourse to the Mutual Agreement Procedure under the relevant treaty 
although the difficulties associated with such an approach may render the process deeply 
unsatisfactory. Where home and host states are Member States of the European Union, the 
provisions of the Arbitration Convention could be invoked to obviate double taxation33.  
 
In recognition of the difficulties associated with asymmetric profit attribution, the OECD 
revised Article 7 in the 2010 Model Treaty. Under new Article 7(3), where a state adjusts 
profits attributable to a permanent establishment and thereby taxes profits that have already 
been subject to tax in the other state, the other state is required to adjust its tax base ‘to the 
extent necessary to eliminate double taxation.’ 
 
This seemingly good news should be tempered somewhat by, firstly, the observation that it 
may take many years for the new Article 7 to be incorporated into new bilateral treaties, as 
they fall to be renegotiated Secondly, the Commentary on new Article 7(3) seems 
significantly to limit its application: it seems that where an adjustment made by a contracting 
state is in accordance with a valid attribution under Article 7(2), recourse must still be had to 
the Mutual Agreement procedure to obviate double taxation. 
 
Where an overseas branch is situated in a non-full treaty location, UK exempt profits are to 
be derived by applying the OECD Model Treaty. Possibilities for asymmetric profit 
attribution may arise from differences between a treaty (if there is one) and the OECD Model. 
Under Article 7 of the new OECD Model, deductions are permitted for interest payments by 
branches of non-financial enterprises and internal royalty payments. Most of the UK’s 
existing treaties may not permit such deductions which could in theory lead to double 
taxation. In practice, however, it may be the case that the UK has no (full) treaty with the 
other state because it is in some way considered to be a tax haven: the diminution in the UK 
exempt amount caused by deductions for interest and royalties might not cause double 
taxation, simply a reduction in the amount of corporate profits escaping taxation in either 
jurisdiction. 
                                                     
32 Opinion of Michael (later Lord) Nolan QC. 
33 Convention 90/436/EEC. The Convention is not actually a part of EU law. It is a multilateral public law 
convention and thus does not,  per se, have direct effect. It is dependent for its effect on national enactment. In 
the UK, the Convention is given effect and priority over domestic law and treaties by s126 and 127 TIOPA 
2010. 
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Profit attribution is a highly complex activity and its application for the purposes of 
exemption will be no different. There may even be added complexity given the different 
permutations around the treaty status of the host state. Attribution to overseas PEs is, 
however, already necessary for credit relief purposes under UK domestic law and the 
provisions of its double tax treaties on the method of giving relief from double taxation. 
(Those provisions effectively require the UK to grant credit for foreign tax which the source 
state has the right to tax under the treaty: the business profits of UK companies may only be 
subject to tax in the host state if and to the extent that they are attributable to a PE there.) 
Whilst, therefore, the FA 2011 changes in no sense represent a simplification in this respect, 
the complexity (or most of it) was already present. 
 
 
3 (iii) Capital allowances and capital gains. 
 
Companies electing into the foreign branch exemption will be unable to claim UK tax 
allowances on capital expenditure on plant and machinery used in the PEs subject to the 
election. This is on the grounds that capital allowances in respect of such expenditure are 
given for the purposes of qualifying activities. Qualifying activities are those in respect of 
which profits are chargeable to UK tax34. Where an election is made to exempt foreign 
branch profits from UK tax, then the activities of the relevant PEs will not be qualifying 
activities so actual capital allowances will not be available. 
 
Notional capital allowances will, however, be given automatically on assets used for the 
purposes of an electing company’s PEs. This will align the treatment with the pre-
existing/continuing credit system: in establishing the UK tax payable on the foreign branch 
profits for credit limitation purposes, available capital allowances reduce the capacity to 
absorb foreign tax credits; notional capital allowances will reduce the amount of the UK-
exempt profits under the election. 
 
The mechanism by which the transition to exemption occurs is that existing assets will be 
deemed to be have been liquidated at their tax written down value35 which will establish the 
available ‘cost’ to the newly-exempt branch for the purposes of calculating the future 
notional allowances. No claw-back or top-up of allowances previously given to the company 
(balancing charges and balancing allowances, respectively) will, therefore, arise. 
 
There is, however, some complexity where the relevant assets have been used for purposes 
other than those of the foreign branch(es) in an earlier period. In those circumstances, market 
value has to be used as disposal value for the purposes of balancing adjustments and 
qualifying expenditure for the newly-exempt branch(es). 
 
Where the historic cost of assets used otherwise than for foreign branch purposes is less than 
£5m, there is no need to deem a market value disposal. If the cost exceeds £5m but is less 
than £50m, the relevant earlier period within which to consider ‘onshore’ use extends only to 
accounting periods ending in the 12 months up to and including 18th July 2011 (the day 
before Royal Assent of FA 2011). However, if the cost exceeds £50m then it is necessary to 
                                                     
34 s15 Capital Allowances Act 2001, inserted by FA 2011 Sch 13, para 15. 
35 Tax written down value = value of the asset still to be depreciated for tax purposes. 
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consider non-foreign branch use in accounting periods beginning in the 6 years up to 18th July 
2011 to determine whether market value should be used as the ‘disposal’ proceeds. 
 
The rationale of the special market rate rule for high value purchases is that very significant 
UK tax relief may have been claimed via capital allowances and, since the relevant assets will 
be excluded from the UK tax base in future, no claw back of excessive allowances (a 
balancing charge) would be possible if accelerated tax depreciation had been enjoyed. 
 
The complexity inherent in the capital allowances analysis must, to a significant extent, refute 
the argument that the FA 2011 reforms represent tax simplification. 
 
Gains and losses arising on capital assets of companies are, in principle, within the scope of 
the exemption to the extent that those assets have been ‘relevant’ in the calculation of the 
profits and losses to be excluded under the election36. In effect, if the relevant double tax 
treaty (or OECD Model in the case of non-full treaty partners) awards taxing rights over 
gains arising to the host state, then any gains will be exempt in the UK. 
 
In this regard, considering Article 13 of the OECD Model Treaty for illustrative purposes, the 
host state may tax gains arising on the alienation of immoveable property within its territory 
and also those arising on moveable property ‘forming part of the business property of a 
permanent establishment’ therein37. 
 
The requirement to determine whether any specific asset forms part of the business property 
of a permanent establishment gives rise to particular problems. (One may observe that this 
aspect is another problem with the fiction of the branch as a putative separate legal entity: the 
legal position is simply that assets are owned by the company, not any particular part of it or 
location wherein it operates.) 
 
The OECD Model Commentary on Article 1338, drawing on the 2010 report on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, uses the criterion of ‘economic’ 
ownership to determine whether assets should properly be regarded as forming part of the 
business property of permanent establishments. Essentially, ‘economic ownership’ for these 
purposes consists in enjoying the right to income from the asset and exposure to gains and 
losses arising from appreciation or depreciation of the property. Local recording of the asset 
in a balance sheet for management accounts purposes is insufficient to imply business 
property status for the branch. 
 
Thus far we may conclude that if the foreign branch enjoys economic ownership of an asset, 
the host state may tax any gains arising on its disposal and, therefore, the gains will be 
exempt in the UK if the company has made the election under s18. Problems arise, however, 
when assets are transferred (in an economic ownership sense) between permanent 
establishments and the UK head office. 
                                                     
36 s18B(1) CTA 2009. 
37 On the grounds that treaties allocate taxing rights over immovable property to the source state with no 
requirement for attribution to a permanent establishment, it was necessary to insert s18B(2) to bring relevant 
gains within the scope of ‘attribution’ under s18A(6). Gains and losses on immovable property are, in effect, 
excluded to the extent that the asset ‘has been used for the purposes of the business carried on by the company 
through the permanent establishment in the territory (to such extent as is appropriate having regard to the extent 
to which it has been so used)....’ 
38 @paragraph 27.1 
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Where, for example, the company disposes of an asset that had previously been transferred-in 
from an exempt branch, the part of the gain arising on the ultimate disposal that is attributable 
to the branch’s period of ‘ownership’ is exempt. HMRC Draft Guidance on the exemption 
gives helpful insights into how the exempt portion of the gain might be calculated. If, for 
example, the host state taxed the gain on the earlier transfer of the asset to head office based 
on a deemed market value disposal, the amount of the gain previously taxed might be the 
exempt portion of the ultimate, actual, disposal. Alternatively, where no market value on the 
initial ‘disposal’ was obtained because, for example, it was not taxed by the host state, it may 
be possible to time-apportion the ultimate gain based on years of economic ownership by the 
exempt PE.  
 
Under s18B(3) where the host state has taxed a gain on transfer in a period before the UK 
company elected for exemption, then the relevant piece of any subsequent gain will not be 
exempt; credit relief will be available for the foreign tax paid. 
 
In addition, there are rules deeming intra-group transfers to be at market value where the 
transferor group company has used the relevant asset in an exempt foreign branch39. 
Ordinarily, under group-relief provisions for Capital Gains Tax, the transfer value on an 
intra-group transfer would be deemed to be such as would give rise to neither a gain nor a 
loss for the transferor. The transferee company inherits the base cost of the transferor, to be 
deducted from disposal proceeds on any subsequent disposal to a third party. However, where 
the asset has been used in an exempt foreign branch of the transferor, the existing rules would 
result in the part of the gain arising during the branch’s period of ownership not benefitting 
from the exemption on ultimate disposal. Accordingly, by applying market value to the 
otherwise no gain/no loss earlier transfer, the real gain realised by the transferee will be 
exempt to the extent of the increase in value realised during the branch’s ownership period. 
The rules will operate in the same way for other disposals deemed to be at no gain/no loss 
such as where gains are reinvested  into replacement business assets (‘rollover relief’). In 
addition, in comparable circumstances, transfers of intellectual property will be deemed to be 
at market value rather than tax written down value, as is usually the case40. 
 
In respect of capital gains, one may conclude that the significant complexity outlined above is 
such that it is untenable to describe the foreign branch exemption as a simplification.      
 
3 (iv) Losses. 
 
Under the UK system of taxing resident companies on their worldwide income, any losses 
arising in foreign branches are immediately available to offset taxable profits from domestic 
and other sources. If overall losses are created as a result of the fiscal consolidation of non-
UK branch results, then those losses may be surrendered to associated companies or, subject 
to restrictions, carried forward against profits of future accounting periods. The issue of 
companies carrying forward foreign branch losses against UK domestic profits without the 
right to tax future profits of those foreign branches was of significant concern to HMRC 
when the possibility of a foreign branch exemption was initially raised. 
 
                                                     
39 s276A TCGA 1992, introduced by FA 2011. 
40 s775(4)(c) CTA 2009. 
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The credit system effectively allows ‘claw-back’ of the loss relief that has previously been 
given in that, assuming carry-forward of the loss in the other jurisdiction and a return to profit 
there, the amount of foreign tax credit reducing the UK Corporation Tax payable is, itself 
reduced. A straightforward example is as follows. (This assumes that the rate of tax is the 
same in the home and host states). 
 
 Year 1 Year 2 
UK profits 5,000 4,000 
PE state profits/(losses) (2,000) 3,000 
 3,000 7,000 
UK Tax @30% 900 2,100 
Foreign tax credit - (300) 
Tax payable 900 1,800 
 
 
In the example, the foreign tax credit in Year 2 is restricted to the tax actually paid in the host 
state ( = (3,000 less brought forward losses of 2,000)@30%). Thus, in Year 2, the UK is 
effectively taxing foreign profits of 2,000 with no corresponding double tax relief. Clearly, 
the possibility of ‘claw-back’ would not exist if the company opted to exempt foreign branch 
profits from the start of Year 2. Furthermore, if the Year 1 foreign branch loss exceeded 
5,000 then, losses would continue to reduce the UK tax base after the election.  
 
To counter this problem and a potentially significant loss to the Exchequer, the new regime 
applies so as to exempt foreign profits only if and to the extent that previous losses of foreign 
branches (= the ‘total opening negative amount’41) as at the start of the first exemption period 
have been exhausted by profits. The rules are complex with exceptions and sub-elections; in 
no sense could this aspect of the new rules be considered to be a ‘simplification’. Draft 
guidance notes specifically on the use of losses in the ‘transitional period’ run to 6 pages42.  
 
In essence, the requirement is to consider aggregate net losses arising in all PEs, starting with 
the first loss-making period starting within six years of the beginning of the first exempt 
period. Where a loss greater than £50m was sustained in any single jurisdiction, the six-years 
is extended back to the six years ending on 18th July 201143. If, for example, a company 
elected for exemption to take effect for its 2025 accounting period, it would still have to 
consider the following calculation to determine whether it had an opening negative amount if 
any branch had suffered losses in excess of £50m. One might remark that this could be a 
significant administrative disincentive to elect in view of the global financial crisis affecting, 
most particularly, banks and financial institutions. 
 
Losses are deemed to be carried forward and offset by the first available profits. The 
cumulative total of the losses is not reduced below nil when profits exceed brought forward 
losses. Capital gains and losses are ignored for the purposes of deriving the opening negative 
amount. If, at the beginning of the first exempt period, there is a negative balance derived 
from this calculation, then profits up to the total of that brought-forward negative balance are 
not covered by the exemption. Credit relief will continue to be available for foreign tax paid.  
The approach may best be illustrated by the following example: 
 
                                                     
41 s18J CTA 2009. 
42 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/branch-exempt-draft-guid.pdf. 
43 Para 34, Sch 13 FA 2011. 
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Mega Limited. 
 
Accounting periods ending 31/12 P/E profits/(losses) 
2010 (500) 
2011 1,000 
2012 (7,000) 
2013 3,000 
2014 2,000 
2015 4,000 
2016 (2,000) 
2017 6,000 
 
Mega Ltd elects for its foreign branch profits to be exempt from the start of its accounting 
period beginning 1st January 2015. 
 
In 2015, Mega Ltd’s opening negative amount is 2,000 so, in 2015, only 2,000 of the PE 
profits will be exempt from UK Corporation Tax. Profits of 2,000 will be subject to credit 
relief. Under CTA 2009 s18K(4), Mega will be able to specify the particular 2015  foreign 
branch profits that are being ‘used up’ by the opening negative amount. This will enable 
Mega to maximise its credit relief claim by, effectively, allocating the unused opening 
negative amount to the PE profits that have been subject to higher rates of tax in the source 
country. 
 
It is possible for companies to elect to ‘stream’ particular, individual, branch results such that 
the results of that location remain within the credit system until the opening negative amount 
has been used up. Thus the exemption will apply earlier than would otherwise have been the 
case for the other branches. The loss amount streamed to the particular location concerned is 
the lower of (a) the opening negative amount for the streamed location itself and (b) the 
aggregate opening negative amount for all branches. Where the aggregate opening negative 
amount exceeds that attributable to the streamed territory, then the difference (‘unstreamed 
loss’) has to be offset against profits in unstreamed territories until exhausted, at which point 
the profits may benefit from exemption. The loss streaming election must be made at the 
same time as the election for exemption itself and is, similarly, irrevocable. 
 
Further complexity in this area arises from anti-avoidance rules44 designed to prevent 
companies from transferring the business of the loss-making PE to an affiliated company. 
Absent such rules, there would be no claw-back of tax relief previously given. Future profits 
in the PE of the affiliate will not be exempt until the loss/opening negative amount of the 
transferor company is exhausted; effectively, the opening negative amount is deemed to be 
assigned to the transferee company together with the business of the PE. 
   
 
3(v) Funding. 
 
In his Guardian article, George Monbiot remarked that whilst foreign branch earnings may be 
exempt, electing UK companies may continue to deduct the expenses of funding their foreign 
branches. In this respect it is correct that there is no limitation, as such, on UK companies’ 
funding costs beyond the usual restrictions that require borrowers to be adequately capitalised 
                                                     
44 s18O CTA 2009. 
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(internal debt) and limit deductions to a proportion of the worldwide group’s borrowing 
costs45. 
 
As discussed above, however, the attribution of profits to exempt PEs requires external  
liabilities, including interest bearing debt, to be attributed. It follows that the costs of 
servicing the debt finance must also be attributed. In addition, intra-entity funding costs will 
be recognised under the attribution rules at s43 TIOPA (although not necessarily under the 
applicable double tax treaty if this is not based on the OECD 2010 Model). These measures 
will have the effect of reducing the tax base in the branch jurisdiction and increasing the tax 
base in the UK by reducing the exempt profits amount. 
 
Given that one of the purposes of the new exemption was to align the treatment of overseas 
PEs with that of foreign direct investment via subsidiary companies, one must consider the 
treatment of the costs of funding those subsidiary companies. In this respect, even though 
income and gains of overseas subsidiaries are generally exempt in the UK under the 
distribution rules and substantial shareholding exemption46, respectively, there is no 
restriction on funding costs beyond the general limitations described above. 
 
It would, therefore, create asymmetry to deny relief for the interest of funding exempt foreign 
branches whilst allowing it for the purposes of funding subsidiaries. In the EU context, any 
such asymmetry could be challenged under the freedom of establishment rights guaranteed 
under Article 49 TFEU. Furthermore, one may observe that the requirement to reduce the UK 
exempt amount for branches to take into account debt finance of the legal entity does not 
apply to the exempt income of any subsidiaries that are wholly equity capitalised. 
 
  
                                                     
45 Under the so-called ‘worldwide debt cap’ provisions at Part 7 TIOPA 2010, where the net debt of the UK 
member of a group of companies exceeds 75% of the group’s external gross debt, deductions for interest 
payments may be restricted. 
46 The exemption of income is subject to the CFC rules. 
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4. Tax Competition. 
 
‘....the Government believes that the corporate tax system can and should be an asset 
for the UK, improving the business environment and helping to attract multinational 
businesses and investment to the UK to support the recovery.’47 
 
In the following section I shall discuss the foreign branch exemption in the context of 
international tax competition. The CIN model/exemption facilitates tax competition to attract 
inward direct investment. Under CEN/credit, states will not necessarily attract investment by 
reducing their rates/bases. As discussed above, credit mechanisms set an effective minimum 
rate of tax for the capital exporter. Avery-Jones48 and Kofler both identify a current global 
trend towards exemption. Kofler observes that 26 out of the 34 OECD Member countries 
adopt a territorial system whereby foreign profits are exempted. 3 Member countries moved 
towards exemption in 2009 alone (including the UK, as discussed above). The trend is 
attributed to increasing competitiveness of national tax systems. Among Mr. Monbiot’s 
objections to the exemption is that facilitating global tax competition will accelerate the so-
called ‘race to the bottom’. This global degradation of the corporate tax base will, it is 
argued, result in an increase in public borrowing, reduction in public spending or regressive 
shift in tax burden to less mobile production factors such as labour and consumption, as 
discussed in Part 2. This will be considered in the UK context but, as described in Part 2, the 
exemption of foreign PE profits is immaterial in the context of UK public revenues.  
 
The UK Government clearly regards tax competition between nation states as being, in 
principle, acceptable. Implicit in the question to be addressed by this paper is that some forms 
of tax competition are acceptable whilst others are not. Supranational bodies such as the 
OECD and the EU have addressed the question of tax competition and their findings and 
guidance as to acceptability of forms are essential in defining a framework of ‘acceptability’. 
The concept clearly remains subjective and certain commentators regard the supranational 
bodies as hypocritical (citing, for example, the EU Member States’ zealous protection of their 
independence regarding fiscal policies). 
 
4 (i)  Background. 
 
Teather defines tax competition as ‘the use by governments of low effective tax rates to 
attract capital and business activity to their country’. The competition to attract portfolio 
investment may be distinguished from that to attract direct investment. States have competed 
to attract portfolio investment by exempting income from source country taxation via 
withholding. This has led to potential non-taxation when the investor fails to declare the 
income to the tax authorities in the residence state. This has been the focus of much attention 
by the OECD and, under threat of sanctions, has caused many tax havens to enter into Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements with other states to obviate the potential for tax evasion. 
We are, however, presently concerned with the competition to attract direct investment: 
production sites of enterprises, operating within a corporate or branch framework. 
Techniques employed by states in attracting such investment have typically included low tax 
rates, tax holidays and special base reductions (such as accelerated depreciation).  
                                                     
47 Corporate Tax Reform: delivering a more competitive system; HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs, 
November 2010, para 1.2 
48 Avery-Jones 2011. 
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To the extent that the FA 2011 changes did, indeed, have the aim of making the UK’s tax 
regime more competitive (see above for doubts as to that premise), the ambition would be to 
attract multinational companies (MNCs) operating via an international branch network where 
some or all of the branches are in low(er) tax jurisdictions. Tax competition is therefore 
relevant, albeit that the purpose was to attract foreign direct investment from companies 
actually looking to invest capital elsewhere. The overriding concept is to make the UK a 
fiscally attractive jurisdiction for holding companies; the foreign branch exemption simply 
seeks to make the relevant features available to inward investors whose outbound foreign 
direct investments take an unincorporated form.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the (de)merits of globalisation, per se. It is 
sufficient to remark that, as a result of technological advances, the relaxation of exchange 
controls and removal of other barriers to foreign trade that have taken place over the last 60 
years, global GDP has increased exponentially. Teather, citing a 2003 OECD report by 
Maddison49 shows that in the 25 years from 1973, per capita GDP increased by more than 
50% in the USA, western Europe and Japan. In the rest of Asia, per capita GDP more than 
doubled in the period. (The statistics also reveal the shocking reality that, in the same period, 
the average economic output per person in Africa remained unchanged.)  
 
The question dividing commentators is whether it is appropriate for countries to compete 
with each other to provide hosting services to companies (and individuals) in the same way as 
companies (and individuals) compete with each other to provide goods and services to 
customers. 
The underlying rationale of tax competition is clear: the purpose is to attract foreign direct 
investment. As to its success in that regard, the empirical data suggest that it is, indeed, 
effective although there are dissenting opinions. De Mooij and Ederveen estimate  that, on 
average, a 1% reduction in effective average tax rate (‘EATR’50) results in a 5.6% increase in 
foreign direct investment. Similarly, a 1% decrease in effective marginal tax rate (‘EMTR’51) 
leads to 4% growth in the inward flow of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, in 
2004, the consulting firm McKinsey52 conducted some research into the effectiveness of tax 
breaks on attracting investment into emerging economies. Their report concluded that, in 
many cases, the inward investment would have been made anyway based on criteria such as 
infrastructure, labour force, accessibility and the size of the domestic market in the country 
concerned. To that extent, tax holidays and other incentives are unnecessary and expensive 
concessions. Similarly, in a US study of state and local taxes, Lynch concluded that there 
were no grounds for supporting tax cuts and incentives to stimulate growth and employment. 
As critics of tax competition have pointed out, if investment decisions of MNCs are driven 
primarily by local infrastructure and the availability of  well-educated employees, then tax 
cuts must be counterproductive if they result in decreased spending on these aspects.  
                                                     
49 A.Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD.  
50 EATR is essentially derived from a calculation of the pre- and post- tax net present value of the return on an 
investment in each country. The investment is a notional composite of fixed assets, intellectual property and 
stock, funded by a mix of debt and equity capital (35:65). The relevant country-specific tax allowances and rates 
are then applied. 
51 EMTR is a measurement of the increase in the cost of capital that is attributable to taxation.   
52 Accessed at http://mkqpreview1.qdweb.net/PDFDownload.aspx?ar=1386 
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The Ruding Committee Report53 from 1992 (which is discussed further below) concluded 
from an empirical study that location decisions of MNCs were, indeed, significantly 
influenced by tax considerations.      
The dichotomy in views is easily explained by the difficulty in identifying factors of 
causation of the foreign direct investment into any given territory. In my opinion, however, 
the example of the Irish Financial Services Centre (‘IFSC’) is clearly indicative of the 
effectiveness of tax incentives on foreign direct investment. Established in Dublin 25 years 
ago, the IFSC enabled relevant businesses to enjoy a 10% rate and generous tax deductions. 
Although the rate subsequently increased, for reasons that will be discussed below, the effect 
on foreign direct investment into Ireland was enormous. The IFSC enabled Ireland to 
leverage one of its competitive advantages: a well educated workforce. The resulting 
employment opportunities helped to limit the historical problem of emigration of young 
people.  
 
4 (ii) The UK position 
 
Braithwaite54 believes that international corporate tax competition began in 1984 when the 
UK cut its Corporation Tax rate from 52% to 35%. This provoked a response from the US 
which cut its rate from 46% to 34% in 1986. Corporate tax rates then continued to fall: 
between 1996 and 2003 the average rate in the 30 richest countries fell from 37.5% to 30%.  
 
Despite being at the apparent vanguard, at least in terms of statutory rate, the UK’s 
competitive position has weakened considerably in recent years.  According to Bilicka et al, 
the UK corporate tax system lost competitiveness during the decade from 2001. As at 2011, 
according to their report, the UK ranked 9th out of the 19 G20 countries (excluding the 
European Union), based on EATR. (Using EMTR as the measure, the UK fared worse, being 
ranked 15th out of  the 19.) In 2002, using the same methodology, the UK ranked 4th. It is 
interesting to note that this relative decline in competitiveness occurred despite a 0.6% 
reduction in the UK EATR over the period. This illustrates the relativity of tax competition: 
whilst the UK may do everything within its power to enhance its competitive position, other 
states may do more. This may lend support to the ‘race to the bottom’ argument. 
Additionally, however, these statistics illustrate the importance of tax base: based solely on 
the statutory rate of Corporation Tax, the UK ranked 7th in the G20 competitiveness table in 
2011. This indicates that an uncompetitive tax base is the central issue and that successive 
cuts in the rate of Corporation Tax might not be effective as a competitive measure. 
 
In terms of a regressive shift in the tax mix, there is no evidence to suggest that reductions in 
the statutory rate of UK Corporation Tax have lead to a material shift in the tax burden. The 
following tax contribution statistics published by HMRC on 20th July 201255  show that in the 
10 years to 2011/2012, the proportional contribution of Corporation Tax to the government 
tax revenues remained fairly static at between 8 and 11%. 
 
 
                                                     
53 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, EC Commission, March 1992. 
54 Braithwaite p20 
55 Accessed at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_receipts/tax-nic-receipts-info-analysis.pdf. Last accessed 7th 
August 2012. 
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Contribution by tax to total HMRC receipts 2001 – 2012 (%) 
 
Year to 
5/4 
IT,CGT, 
NIC 
VAT Corporation 
Tax 
Hydrocarbon 
oils 
Stamp 
taxes 
Duties56 Other Total 
revenue 
(£bn) 
2002 54 19 10 7 2 4 3 321 
2003 54 20 9 7 2 4 3 324 
2004 55 20 8 7 2 4 3 344 
2005 55 20 9 6 2 4 3 371 
2006 55 18 11 6 3 4 4 398 
2007 55 18 10 6 3 4 3 424 
2008 56 18 10 6 3 4 3 451 
2009 58 18 10 6 2 4 4 439 
2010 58 17 9 6 2 4 3 409 
2011 55 19 9 6 2 4 4 447 
2012 54 21 9 6 2 4 4 467 
Average 55 19 10 6 2 4 3  
 
 
 
4 (iii) The OECD and the EU: defining ‘harmful’ tax competition and countermeasures 
against it. 
 
In 1991, the European Commission asked the former Dutch Finance Minister Onno Ruding to 
consider tax competition within (but also tax impediments to) the internal market. The 
Committee reported that there was no evidence to suggest that independent action by national 
governments is likely to provoke ‘unbridled general tax competition’ leading to erosion of the 
corporate tax revenues of Member States. There was, however, concern that Member States 
were introducing special tax schemes designed to attract internationally mobile business, 
particularly in the financial sector. 
 
The UK’s 2011 move to elective exemption for foreign branches was ostensibly designed 
specifically to attract internationally mobile business and would be of particular relevance to 
financial sector companies. It could not, however, be described as a ‘special tax scheme’. 
This distinction is central to the differentiating characteristics of acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of tax competition within the normative framework established by the OECD and the 
EU.  
 
Notwithstanding the apparent focus on ‘special schemes’, the Ruding Committee did 
recommend a minimum statutory corporation tax rate (30%) and also that common rules for a 
minimum tax base should be established ‘so as to limit excessive tax competition between 
Member States intended to attract mobile investment....’ 
 
Member States’ reluctance to cede fiscal sovereignty was always likely to be a barrier to such 
integration. In 1997, however, the Council did adopt a Code of Conduct for business 
taxation.57 This Code which is effectively an agreed set of principles rather than a legally 
enforceable agreement ‘concerns those measures which affect or may affect in a significant 
                                                     
56 = Excise duties levied on alcohol and tobacco. 
57 Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within 
the Council of 1 December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. 
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way the location of business activity within the Community.’ As such, it establishes a model 
by which to assess whether tax competition initiatives are acceptable or not.  
 
The Code applies to any tax measures (affecting rate or base) that provide for a significantly 
lower effective level of taxation than that generally applicable in the relevant Member State. 
Five disjunctive criteria are used to determine whether the tax measures reviewed are 
‘harmful’. These are: 
 
• the tax advantages apply only to non-residents of the state or only to transactions 
with non-residents; 
• the tax advantages are not available in a purely domestic context or do not impact the 
national tax base; 
• no real economic activity or substance is required to receive the tax benefits; 
• profit determination differs from internationally accepted norms; 
• the provisions are not transparent or are not operated in a transparent fashion. 
 
Member States committed to refrain from introducing any new measures that would be 
considered harmful under any of the above criteria and also to amend any relevant laws and 
practices ‘as soon as possible taking into account the Council’s discussions following the 
review process.’ A working group was established (subsequently called the Primorolo group 
after its chair) in order to assess Member States’ relevant tax measures and, by 1999, the 
group had reported back that there were 203 potentially harmful regimes within the Member 
States and 86 in the various dependent territories such as the Channel Islands. 
 
It seems clear that the UK’s foreign branch exemption would not be considered harmful 
within the EU’s definition: none of the five criteria is satisfied. In any event, many states 
adopt the exemption method to relieve the double taxation of permanent establishment 
income, albeit with some restrictions as to the nature of the business conducted and with anti-
diversion rules (see further below). Thus the foreign branch exemption would appear to be 
perfectly acceptable from an EU Code standpoint. 
 
In addition to the Code of Conduct, however, it is necessary to consider the State Aid rules. 
Article 3 TFEU awards the Union exclusive competence over ‘the establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.’58  Under Article 107 
TFEU, Member States are precluded from granting aid through state resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts (or may distort) competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods. 
 
The potential application of the State Aid rules to business taxation was set out in a notice 
issued by the Commission on 11th November 199859. For a tax measure to be deemed to be 
illegal State aid, four (conjunctive) criteria must be satisfied. These are: 
 
• the recipients benefit from a tax advantage in that they are relieved of a tax burden 
they would otherwise bear by means of a base reduction, tax credit or exemption or 
even by administrative measures that defer or cancel tax liabilities and 
• the advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources and 
                                                     
58 TFEU Article 3.1(b) 
59 EC Commission Notice of 11 November 1998 on the application of the State Aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation (98/C384/03).  
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• the measure must affect competition and 
• the measure must be selective60 in terms of its application. 
 
Where the Commission finds that Member State tax rules constitute illegal state aid that is 
not compatible with the internal market, ‘it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish 
or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission. If the State 
concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or 
any other interested State may....refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union direct.’61 
 
The IFSC regime discussed above was found by the Commission to be in breach of the State 
Aid rules and was withdrawn by the Irish government at the end of 2005. In order to continue 
to attract inward investment, the Irish government reduced the headline rate of corporation 
tax to 12.5% on all active business, thereby circumventing selectivity arguments.   
 
The FA 2011 election could  not constitute a breach of EU Law in this respect. There is no 
selectivity between taxpayers: all companies’ foreign profits whether generated in 
subsidiaries or branches are or may be exempt, subject to CFC apportionment and the anti-
diversion rules discussed below. Indeed, exempting dividends but not PE profits may 
potentially have caused a State Aid problem. 
 
Aside from the EU, the OECD has been at the forefront of initiatives to tackle ‘harmful tax 
competition’. In 1996, it was called upon to ‘develop measures to counter the distorting 
effects of harmful tax competition on investment and financing decisions and the 
consequences for national tax bases’. When its report62 was published two years later, the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (‘CFA’) concluded that ‘harmful tax competition’, as 
defined, was caused by tax havens and ‘harmful preferential tax regimes’. Harmful 
competition was said to 
 
- distort financial and, indirectly, real investment flows; 
- undermine the integrity and fairness of tax structures; 
- discourage taxpayer compliance; 
- re-shape the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending; 
- cause undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases such as 
labour, property and consumption and 
- increase administrative costs for taxpayers and tax authorities. 
 
Harmful preferential tax regimes were defined by reference to factors such as no or low 
effective tax rates and a ‘ring fencing’ of regimes. (The latter concept is one whereby the 
benefits of the tax-advantageous system are not generally available to resident/domestic 
taxpayers.) 
 
The 1998 report provoked some consternation amongst economists and businesses. The 
following year, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD published ‘A 
                                                     
60 ‘Selective’ measures fall into three categories – aid to a particular business sector (e.g. Manufacturing, 
Financial Services etc); aid limited to certain territories or regions of Member States and ‘horizontal’ aid which 
is limited to particular functions of enterprises.   
61 TFEU Article 108.2 
62 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition – An Emerging Global Issue (1998) 
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Business View of Tax Competition’63 which was highly critical of the CFA’s report and 
explained the benefits of tax competition as follows: 
 
‘In the global economy, international tax competition among nations tends to keep the 
negative effects of taxation limited. [...]. Low tax rates tend to impose a discipline on the 
countries levying such taxes to make more efficient use of tax revenues in their spending 
decisions. The Report does convey an impression that the OECD is advocating a reversal 
of this trend, thus encouraging higher taxes.’ 
 
In 2001, consensus between the OECD committees was achieved and a paper by the 
respective chairmen was published. ‘Promoting Tax Competition’64 essentially emphasised 
the importance of transparency and compliance but that there was no desire to harmonise tax 
structures or rates or set minimum levels of taxation. Since then, the Harmful Tax 
Competition Project has significantly focussed on transparency and, in particular, the 
concluding of Tax Information Exchange Agreements to inhibit tax evasion via the use of 
offshore accounts. 
 
The 1998 Report did, however, recommend that states exempting foreign source income 
should restrict the scope of the exemption65. The CFA’s recommendation was that income 
subject to a low level of tax in the source state as a result of the operation of a harmful tax 
regime there should not benefit from exemption in the residence/parent company state. 
 
The UK rules (both for branch exemption and for attributing CFC profits) do consider the 
effective rate of tax in the source state but, as a result of challenges under European law 
discussed below, only as a part of the analysis. The critical test for exemption of profits in 
subsidiaries and branches is that those profits have not been artificially diverted from the UK. 
 
4 (iv) Anti-diversion. 
 
Under an exemption system, companies have an incentive to maximise profits in branches in 
low tax jurisdictions to minimise their effective tax rate. In order to protect the UK tax base 
from artificial diversions of profit to tax haven branches, FA 2011 introduced rules to 
disapply the exemption in certain circumstances. These provisions were temporary measures 
pending the introduction of a comprehensive new CFC regime in FA 2012 that is to be 
applied, mutatis mutandis, to foreign permanent establishments also. 
 
In brief, the rules66 do not allow for exemption if host-state tax on attributed profits is less 
than 75% of the UK tax that would be due. If the profits in the relevant territory (all 
branches) amount to less than £200,000 or the company passes the ‘motive’ test, then the 
exemption can still apply, notwithstanding the low tax in the host state. 
 
The ‘motive’ test is passed, firstly, if a diversion of profits to reduce UK tax is not the main 
reason (or a main reason) for carrying on business through the permanent establishment. In 
this respect, a ‘safe harbour’ was introduced as a transitional provision67. Essentially, this first 
aspect of the motive test would be deemed to be satisfied provided that the profits of the 
                                                     
63 Accessed at http://www.biac.org/statements/tax/htc.pdf 
64 Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/11/1915964.pdf 
65 ibid Chapter 3 (II) para 3. 
66 s18G-H CTA 2009. 
67 Paras 31 and 32, Sch 13 FA 2011. 
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permanent establishment in the first exempt period did not exceed those of the immediately 
preceding period by more than 10%. Also there must be no major change in the foreign 
branch business and none of its assets can have belonged to a company within the CFC 
regime. Where the exempt business was carried on in an overseas company prior to the first 
exemption period, there are corresponding tests for the ‘safe harbour’ to apply. 
 
The second requirement to pass the motive test is that any transactions reflected in the branch 
profit attribution may result in only a ‘minimal’ reduction in UK tax or, if the reduction is 
more than minimal, the transactions must not have been entered into for the (or a) main 
purpose of avoiding UK tax. A reduction in UK tax is determined by considering the position 
as it would have obtained if the transaction(s) had not been entered into. No hypothetical 
alternative transaction(s) are to be considered in making the comparison.  
 
The multiplicity of situations wherein transactions may result in material reductions in UK 
tax places great emphasis on the rationale for entering into transactions. Thus subjectivity 
arises, including the relative importance of different factors in the decision-making process. 
HMRC guidance specifies that a transaction may fail the test if, notwithstanding a ‘genuine’ 
(i.e. non tax) purpose, ‘a reduction in UK tax was also one of the main purposes’. 
 
The new CFC rules introduced in FA 2012 are, like the foreign branch exemption, apparently 
aimed at enhancing the UK’s competitive position (specifically as a holding company 
jurisdiction). The compatibility of the former regime68 with European law had been 
successfully challenged by Cadbury Schweppes69 and Vodafone70. In the former, landmark, 
case the ECJ held that companies’ freedom of establishment71 was infringed by a requirement 
to include undistributed  low-taxed profits of subsidiaries in other Member States within the 
domestic tax base. The freedom of establishment, however, did require genuine economic 
activities to be undertaken in the other Member State: if activities in the other state 
constituted ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, then a CFC regime could be compatible with EU 
Law. 
 
The new CFC rules72 are lengthy and highly complex. In essence, profits are deemed to have 
been artificially diverted where (1) most of the profits are connected with ‘significant people 
functions’ performed in the UK and (2) there are no material non-tax reasons for the 
separation of people functions from offshore assets and (3) the arrangements between 
branch/subsidiary and head office/parent company would not have been entered into between 
third parties. 
  
                                                     
68 Pt XVII Ch IV ICTA 1988. 
69 Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue C‐ 
196/04 [2006] ECR I‑7995 
70 Vodafone 2 v The Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2008] EWHC 1569 (Ch) 
71 Articles 49 and 54 TFEU (ex Articles 43 and 48 TEC). 
72 Part 9A TIOPA 2010. 
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5. Concluding remarks. 
The twofold aims of this paper were to establish whether the elective foreign branch 
exemption was ‘acceptable’ tax competition and tax simplification and/or whether it was ‘the 
heist of the century’. 
 
On the grounds that exemption is an internationally accepted standard for relieving double 
taxation one may, prima facie, conclude that the FA 2011 changes do fall within the bounds 
of acceptability. The changes do not appear to be ‘harmful’ within the definitions of the 
supranational bodies  although there is no restriction on the scope of the exemption where a 
low effective rate of tax in the host state may itself be attributable to a harmful practice. 
There are, instead, rules restricting the scope of the exemption when profits are artificially 
diverted to exempt foreign branches. Contrivance is the key: if there is substantive investment 
into another state that has decided, in its national interest, to set effective tax rates at a 
particular level, the free movement of capital into that state should not be restricted by CEN 
considerations. This is so particularly when a mature economy such as the UK can no longer 
compete globally in capital-hungry manufacturing business but domestic companies do  have 
capital to be deployed in generating economic return. The country is now predominately a 
service economy and its main ‘selling points’ are an internationally recognised legal system 
and well-trained professionals. It must be rational to attempt to attract businesses (such as 
holding companies) to leverage the economy’s strengths. As for tax relief for the costs of 
funding exempt foreign branches, as discussed in Part 3, a proper attribution (where possible 
under the relevant treaty pre-OECD 2010 Model) should preclude significant UK base 
erosion. In any event, the UK’s commitments to its EU partners rendered the exemption 
inevitable given the historical start-point of Corporation Tax exemption for domestic 
dividends. As discussed, we may trace the foreign branch exemption back to that position via 
exemption for dividends from overseas companies.  
 
Economists disagree on the effect of the so-called race to the bottom and shifts in the tax 
burden to other production factors. The HMRC table at page 26 suggests that this has not 
occurred in the UK although the aggregation of IT, CGT and NIC is probably too broad to 
enable definitive conclusions. In addition, there is no consensus on whether higher levels of 
taxation at the corporate level actually push down labour costs (wages) given requirements 
for a minimum return on capital. If that is the case, higher corporate taxes may actually 
constitute a ‘heist’ on labour. On the other hand, as Professor Avery Jones says, ‘taxpayers 
under a credit system feel at a disadvantage when all the competitors are under an exemption 
system’. Amid the uncertainty, the fiscal prerogative of independent nation states to legislate 
in their own best interests must remain sacrosanct. 
 
As for ‘simplification’, it seems clear that the election has no such claims: the complexities 
associated with  losses, capital gains, capital allowances and profit attribution must surely 
negate any arguments that exemption is simpler than credit, albeit that certain features (e.g. 
profit attribution) are common to both systems. 
 
Monbiot’s critique of the new exemption regime extended also to the composition of the 
committees ‘providing strategic oversight of the development of corporate tax policy’. 
Representatives of most major UK-headquartered MNCs are on such committees. It is not 
clear but presumably the objection is in respect of vested interests apparently determining 
government policy. HMRC, HM Treasury, the professional firms and others who provided 
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responses to the Consultation and the MPs who sit on the Public Bill Committee that 
discussed the Finance Bill would presumably find such an argument objectionable. Having 
HMRC and representatives from commerce/industry work on tax policy together must surely 
result in better, targeted legislation to implement the elected government’s mandated 
proposals.  
 
Finally, as to ‘the heist of the century’, the projected revenue impact calculations by HMRC 
simply fail to bear this out. Even if a reduction in corporate tax liabilities does indeed cause a 
regressive shift in the tax burden and, therefore, is a ‘heist’ (this is unproven on the UK data), 
a maximum impact of -£80m hardly qualifies as a robbery of significance in the scheme of 
HMRC’s annual collections.  
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